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This paper presents a statistical model that quantifies the influence of various stakeholders on chemical manufacturing companies’ environmental performance.  We based the model on a framework outlined by Andrew Hoffman in Competitive Environmental Strategy: A Guide to the Changing Business Landscape.​[1]​  The model uses actors from the following four categories:  Social Drivers, Resource Drivers, Market Drivers and Coercive (Regulatory) Drivers as independent variables to explain the variation in Toxic Release Inventory Emissions (TRI) across the 50 states in the years 1995 through 2004.
Our final model indicates that the number of ISO 14001 certified chemical companies contributes to lower TRI emissions and that higher NGO membership contributes to higher TRI emissions: NormalizedTRIdata = 213,051.5 – 1,125.7*ISOcertifiedcompanies + 4.05* NGOMembers.






Corporate activity can significantly impact the environment.  As corporate stakeholders become increasingly concerned with this impact and consequently take action against corporations, corporate executives may struggle to understand when it is necessary to take action to reduce their companies’ environmental impacts.  Similarly, stakeholders attempting to influence corporate environmental behavior may not understand which action channels will most motivate a company or industry.  In this paper, we discuss a statistical model we created to quantify the influence a variety of stakeholders have on environmental performance in the chemical manufacturing industry.  







We are not the first researchers to attempt to identify influencers of corporate environmental behavior.  Our work is informed by and augments the work done previously in this area, both when examining company behavior broadly and chemical industry behavior specifically.  The section that follows is our review of the articles we consider most relevant and an explanation of how they influenced our work.
Our model attempts to capture the factors that lead a firm to reduce pollution.  The paper, “Stakeholders and Environmental Management Practices:  An Institutional Framework,” by Magali Delmas and Michael W. Toffel, discusses why firms may adopt environmental programs that exceed regulatory compliance.  Delmas and Toffel use an “institutional theory framework” that is similar to the one we adopted (i.e., factors that include government, regulators, customers, competitors, community and environmental interest groups, and industry associations).  They propose that a firm’s organizational characteristics will cause it to interpret pressures from each of these actors differently, which results in firms adopting different policies towards the environment.​[2]​  
When examining environmental impact reduction in the chemical industry specifically, we looked to the paper “Voluntary Pollution Reductions and the Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50 Program” by Abdoul Sam and Robert Innes, which identifies correlations 

between pollution reduction, participation in the EPA’s 33/50 voluntary pollution reduction program, regulatory enforcement and boycotts.  Though the firms examined in this paper came from a variety of fields, not just the chemical industry, we surmised that its conclusions might stand when applied specifically to the chemical industry.  Sam and Innes conclude that important factors in a firm’s reduction of pollution are participation in the voluntary program, government inspections, preempting regulation, and deterring boycotts.  Another factor may be a desire to raise competitors’ costs.  They found no statistically significant link between pollution reduction and a firm’s proximity to the consumer (green marketing) or between pollution reduction and the presence of “strict environmental liability.”​[3]​   
Andy King and Michael J. Lenox’s paper, “Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program,” informed our decision to use Responsible Care as an indicator.  Using the Environmental Protection Agency’s  (EPA) Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data as a measure of environmental performance and weighting chemicals by level of toxicity, King and Lenox tested eight hypotheses about the effect membership in Responsible Care has on both member and non-member chemical companies.  Their most striking conclusion was that members of Responsible Care are improving their relative environmental performance more slowly than are non-members.  Though the chemical industry’s environmental performance improved more rapidly after the inception of Responsible Care, it only did so among companies that were not members of Responsible Care.  We were interested to see whether our model would also show a negative impact of Responsible Care membership on environmental performance.​[4]​
When developing our model, we also reviewed Wilma Rose Anton, George Deltas, and Madhu Khanna’s paper entitled “Incentives for Environmental Self-Regulation and Implications for Environmental Performance.”  In this paper, Anton et al develop a quantitative model to examine the factors that caused firms to adopt Environmental Management Systems (EMS) and whether the comprehensiveness of an EMS had any impact on the toxic releases of the firms.  Like King and Lenox, Anton et al used the TRI as an indicator, reinforcing our decision to use this data as our dependent variable.  Based on their model, they found that the greatest factors influencing EMS adoption were consumer and investor pressure, as well as future liability and the scale of past emissions.​[5]​  We were able to include the first two indicators in our own model.  





How Our Paper Differs From Prior Scholarship








We based our analysis of the potential influencers of corporate environmental behavior on the framework proposed by Andrew J. Hoffman in his book Competitive Environmental Strategy: A Guide to the Changing Business Landscape.​[7]​  Hoffman’s framework posits that the influencers of corporate environmental behavior can be grouped into four categories: Social Drivers, Resource Drivers, Market Drivers and Coercive (Regulatory) Drivers.  Within these four groups reside numerous actors, enumerated below.  
	Social Drivers include Environmental NGOs, the Press, the Courts, Religious Institutions, the Community and Academia
	Coercive Drivers include Domestic Regulation and International Regimes
	Resource Drivers include Suppliers, Banks, Shareholders/Investors, Buyers and Insurance Companies
	Market Drivers include Consumers, Trade Associations, Competitors and Consultants
We decided to narrow our focus to one specific industry when building our model because we believe that the level of influence of these actors varies across industries.  We decided that the chemical manufacturing industry would be most appropriate for a first attempt at a model because of the availability and comprehensiveness of a dependent variable in the EPA’s TRI data, which annually tracks chemical emissions by members of the chemical manufacturing industry.  We also decided that we would focus our model on companies in the U.S., both because the TRI is only applicable to companies in the U.S. and because quantifying the differences in political systems and actors across countries would expand beyond the scope of an initial model and dataset.
Our next step was to pick the actors within each of Hoffman’s four categories that we believed would be the most relevant drivers of environmental action in the chemical manufacturing industry.  We based our selection on the relationships each of these actors had with the chemical manufacturing industry over time.  We explain in detail below the specific reasons we chose to include each actor.
The “Social Drivers” we measured were Environmental NGOs, the Press, the Courts, the Community, and Academia.  
	Recent campaigns by environmental NGOS against chemical manufacturing companies, such as Greenpeace’s campaign against Dow Chemical, demonstrate that environmental NGOs are trying to influence chemical manufacturing companies’ behavior on the environment.  We included NGOs as an actor to try to measure whether these actions truly have an impact on company behavior. 
	Press coverage of chemical manufacturing companies’ environmental impacts raises awareness of this behavior among the general public.  We wanted to determine whether greater publicity of their actions on the environment caused companies to change their behavior.  
	Courts are an actor whose decisions impact the particular company being tried in court.  We wondered if an increase in the number of cases against chemical manufacturing companies would cause companies in the industry to take proactive (or reactive) steps to protect themselves from environmental lawsuits.  
	Community members often provide vocal censure of chemical manufacturing companies’ environmental behavior.  We wondered if the opinion and actions of this actor had a measurable impact on the behavior of the industry.  
	Finally, we heard that King and Lenox’s paper on Responsible Care received notice within the chemical industry.  We hoped to measure whether academic opinion in general translated into action by chemical manufacturing companies.  




The “Coercive Driver” we measured was Domestic Regulation.  
	Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett found that domestic regulation was the biggest driver of TRI emission reduction; we wanted to verify this finding in our model.  
	We did not study international regimes as a coercive driver because we focused exclusively on the chemical manufacturing industry in the U.S; while international regimes may influence the action of U.S. chemical companies, we considered these regimes outside of our project scope.  
In the category of “Resource Drivers,” we looked at investors and buyers.
	Conversations with individuals in the industry indicated to us that chemical manufacturing industry executives view investors as one of the main influencers of corporate behavior.​[8]​  We wanted to see if our model verified that assumption.  
	We viewed buyers as an important group because they are the immediate customers of the chemical manufacturing industry.  As the purchasers of the companies’ products, we reasoned that buyers’ environmental beliefs and actions should have significant affects on company environmental behavior.  
	We decided not to examine suppliers to the chemical industry in our model.  Because these suppliers are so dispersed around the world and supply such basic elements, we thought it unlikely that they would have a unified impact on the industry that we could measure in our model.  This decision was specific to the chemical manufacturing industry – in other industries suppliers may have greater influence.
	Our research indicated that banks do not currently take environmental impacts into consideration when lending to chemical manufacturing companies, except with regard to how they impact risk.  We thus excluded them from our model.
	We came to a similar conclusion about insurance companies.  Because both banks and insurance companies’ measures of risk take so many factors into consideration, we did not think we could measure their specific relationship to the environmental behavior of chemical manufacturing companies. 
The “Market Driver” we examined was the chemical manufacturing industry trade association Responsible Care.  
	We chose Responsible Care because of King and Lenox’s findings about its influence on the chemical industry, which we hoped to replicate or disprove.  
	We chose not to include consumers as a variable because the chemical manufacturing industry is largely a business-to-business (B2B) supplier, not a business-to-consumer (B2C) retailer to individual consumers; therefore, we did not think consumer pressure would be significant.  In addition, we thought that the chemical manufacturing industry’s B2B model meant that the “buyer” category would more directly capture consumer pressure applied to this industry.  







Once we selected the group of actors, we attempted to find and/or create numerical datasets indicative of the influence of each of these actors on the chemical manufacturing industry.  We defined the chemical manufacturing industry as all companies designated as code 28 by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC).  We sought to measure each actor over the ten-year period from 1995 to 2004 on a state-by-state basis.  We chose 2004 as the upper limit because when we began working on this project in 2005, 2004 was the most recent year for which full data was reliably available.  We tried to get as much data on a state level as possible.  However, with certain variables it was only possible to obtain data on a national level.  We indicated in the text the variables collected on a state level and those collected on a national level.  Each variable is discussed in detail in the text below.  Appendix 5: Sources of Data for Variables provides detailed information on how to access the data comprising each variable.






	Following is an explanation of how and why we selected the data that comprise each of our variables.
Social Drivers
Environmental NGOs
Money raised, actions taken (boycotts, press, etc), and NGO membership are all potential measures of pressure put on chemical manufacturing companies by environmental NGOs.  Of these, we selected NGO membership as our variable because we thought this statistic best reflected the magnitude of the constituency represented by the NGO.  We requested membership data by state for the years 1995 – 2004 from the following seventeen largest environmental NGOs in the U.S.: The Nature Conservancy, National Wildlife Federation, World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace USA, National Audubon Society, Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, Wilderness Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Water Environment Federation, National Parks Conservation Foundation, Air & Waste Management Association, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, Izaak Walton League of America, Citizens for a Better Environment, and Environmental Action.  Of these seventeen, the Sierra Club was the only NGO that was able to provide us with a complete dataset.  We therefore used the Sierra Club membership data as our indicator of NGO pressure.    


























To measure Press influence, we collected the number of articles published each year about the chemical industry’s impact on the environment.  We hypothesized that the number of articles might positively correlate with industry action; more articles about the chemical industry’s environmental impact could cause more public scrutiny, which in turn might spur companies to act to preempt reputation damage.
We searched for articles within the Lexis-Nexis Environmental Database.  This database contains searchable information from the following environmental sources: journals, conference papers and proceedings, federal and state government reports, major daily newspapers, consumer and trade magazines, newsletters, law reviews, administrative codes, case law, regulatory agency decisions and waste site and hazardous material data.​[9]​  We conducted our search within “all” sources in the “Environmental News” category.​[10]​  We chose to search in the Lexis-Nexis Environmental Database rather than the popular press because we considered these environmental news sources as feeders for major newspapers’ stories on the environment.  
We modeled our search terms on the methodology used by Christine R. Ader in her article, “A Longitudinal Study of Agenda Setting for the Issue of Environmental Pollution.”​[11]​  This article outlined a study conducted to measure the influence of the New York Times on public opinion.  Ader measured environmental articles by searching the Times index for the years 1970 to 1990 using the following search terms: air pollution, environment, water pollution and waste materials and disposal.  She chose those terms in response to an article she read in 1988 that cited disposal of wastes, air quality and water quality as the three most salient environmental issues.  
We used Ader’s search terms, but paired each of them with the phrase “chemical industry” to ensure we retrieved only articles relevant to our model. We used the phrase “chemical industry” instead of “chemical manufacturing industry” because we thought that the press would be unlikely to make a distinction between the two in its coverage.  We also divided Ader’s last term into two terms.  Our final search term pairs were: “air pollution” and “chemical industry;” “environment” and “chemical industry;” “water pollution” and “chemical industry;” “waste materials” and “chemical industry;” and “waste disposal” and “chemical industry.”  We searched for each of these five pairs of terms from 1/1 to 12/31 for each of the ten years of our model. 
After obtaining the raw number of articles that each of these pairs of search terms returned, we sorted all of the articles and removed any duplicates.  If the same article appeared in a source in different editions or on different days, each of these occasions was counted as a separate article.  Because we focused on the chemical manufacturing industry in the U.S., we removed from our count any articles that primarily concerned a foreign country or came from a source based in a foreign country.  The number of articles remaining after removing the duplicate and foreign articles was the number we used to represent press influence from that year.  Because these sources were national instead of local, we used the same number for each state for that year.
















We thought that the number of lawsuits involving chemical manufacturers was the best representation of court pressure on chemical firms to improve their environmental performance.  It made intuitive sense to us that an increase in the number of lawsuits against chemical manufacturers would motivate firms to lower their TRI emissions to avoid costly legal battles.  
To find data on the number of environmental lawsuits against the chemical manufacturing industry, we used the Westlaw Environmental Database, which contains only lawsuits about environmental issues.  We searched the database on a state by state basis, using the search term “chemical” and the date parameters January 1, 1995 to January 1, 2005.  We manually sorted the results of this search and counted only those cases that involved a chemical manufacturing company, as defined by SIC Code 28.  We used each case’s coding by year to create individual data points for each state and each year.  






















We chose public opinion about the environment as a proxy to quantify community pressure.  Of all of our actors, public opinion (community) may be the most challenging to quantify.  This is due both to the lack of comprehensive databases spanning our timeframe and to the fact that past studies show that public opinion may be a flawed measure in and of itself because it often has low correlation with actions.
In our model, we chose to measure public opinion via the Gallup Poll.  The Gallup Poll was the only data source we could find that had a comprehensive database on public opinion about the environment that spanned our model’s timeframe.  Since 1984, the Gallup Poll has asked the following question: With which of these statements would you most agree:  Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth (or) economic growth should be given priority, even at the risk of harming the environment?​[12]​  We used the percentage of respondents who answered that protection of the environment should receive priority even at the risk of curbing economic growth as our indicator.  Because no percentage was available for 1996, we calculated this data point by taking the average of 1997 and 1995.


























We found two potential indicators of academic pressure on the chemical manufacturing industry.  The first is the number of academic degrees granted in environmental fields.  The second is the number of academic articles dealing with the chemical industry and the environment.  We chose to use the latter variable.  We did not think that the number of academic degrees in the environmental field would indicate academic pressure because so many individuals do not pursue careers in the field in which they receive their degrees.  We therefore thought academic articles represented a better indicator of academic thought and leadership on this issue. 
















An interesting result of this search is that the number of academic articles about the chemical industry declined significantly from 1995 to 2004.  In 1995, there were 60; in 2004, there were 7 (see graph below).  We hypothesized that this decrease could be due to a wide range of factors, such as a specific action taken by the chemical industry (such as increasing self-regulation policies), a specific environmental event that occurred in the industry, a general lack of support for research in this area by universities, or perhaps a decrease in the number of academic positions dedicated to this type of research.  Unfortunately, examining the titles of the articles and general news feeds regarding the chemical industry did not yield any insight into the cause for the articles’ decrease.  We were unable to pursue the hypothesis that universities could be decreasing support for academic research in this area.
Coercive Drivers
Domestic Regulation 
Domestic regulation is one of the few categories with a readily available relevant and complete dataset.  We measured domestic regulation on a state-by-state basis using the voting results compiled by the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) in the group’s annual National Environmental Scorecards.​[13]​  The LCV Scorecards are available on the group’s website dating from 1971.  The scorecards give each member of Congress a percent score based upon how they voted on what the LCV considers the most important environmental issues that appeared before Congress that year.  To obtain one number per state per year for our model, we averaged the scores of all the Congressional officials from that state. 
Though LCV ratings are not a direct measure of specific environmental regulations in a particular state, they do provide an indication of the overall importance given to environmental protection in that state. An LCV rating reflects the environmental position of the state’s Congresspeople, which is usually a reflection of the environmental position of a majority of voters in that state.

























We chose socially responsible investing as an indicator because we believe it reflects investor pressure on companies to behave in more environmentally responsible ways.  Our data came from the most recent version of the Social Investment Forum Industry Research Program’s biennial “Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States.”  The 2005 version of the report contains all the information the Social Investment Forum compiled since it first published the report in 1995.​[14]​  









































The American Chemistry Council (ACC) is the chemical industry’s trade association in the U.S.  To be a member of the ACC, a chemical company must also enroll in the Responsible Care program.  Responsible Care is a global initiative under which companies work together to continuously improve their health, safety and environmental performance, and to communicate with stakeholders about their products and processes.​[16]​  In the words of the industry, “The Responsible Care ethic helps our industry to operate safely, profitably and with due care for future generations, and was commended by UNEP as making a significant contribution to sustainable development at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.”​[17]​
We chose to use membership in Responsible Care to represent trade association pressure because we thought the number of companies that belonged indicate the support the industry gives to Responsible Care’s goals.  We obtained membership numbers for the years 1995 through 2001 from Michael L. Barnett, PhD, a professor at the College of Business Administration at the University of South Florida, who obtained them directly from the Chemical Manufacturing Association’s member directory.  We obtained Responsible Care membership numbers from 2003 – 2006 from Debra Phillips, the Managing Director of Responsible Care.  For the missing year of data (2002), we took the average of the 2001 and the 2003 numbers.






















Other Components of the Model
Toxic Release Inventory Data
The EPA manages the TRI and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) established the program.  The TRI database contains details regarding almost 650 chemicals that a variety of industries and federal facilities manage through disposal or other releases.​[19]​  We chose this variable as our Y variable because it provides a very detailed record of environmental impact, as measured by chemical waste management, for the chemical manufacturing industry.  It is a comprehensive variable because of the federal requirement that all members of the industry report on their emissions.  Additionally, the data are organized by facility and location, which enabled us to gather emissions on a state level. 
In order to compile the appropriate data, we first selected for the 1995 list of chemicals.  The EPA made significant changes to reporting requirements in 1995.  The addition of new chemicals to the TRI dataset, and the removal of others, makes it difficult to compare chemical lists from pre- and post-1995 without selecting for only pre-1995 chemicals.  We screened the data to select for companies classified under SIC Code 28.  We then collected the data state by state for each of the ten years we examined.  Finally, we normalized the data by dividing total emissions for each state by the number of factories in each state.  This allowed us to control for dramatic changes in the data that may have resulted from the elimination or addition of manufacturing facilities in a state.



























We chose to measure industry lobbying dollars as an indicator of how much pressure corporations feel to regulate.  Our hypothesis was that the greater the pressure companies felt to regulate, the more financial resources the industry would devote to lobbying the government.  We obtained chemical industry lobbying dollars for the years 1998 through 2004 from the Center for Public Integrity, whose figures are based upon Senate Office of Public Record filings.​[20]​  We obtained the number for 1997 from Open Secrets.org, a campaign finance website.​[21]​  We were unable to obtain information for the years 1995 and 1996, which is likely due to the fact that the law requiring Senate Office of Public Record filings to be made public was not passed until 1996.














Median Income for Family of Four 
The economic situation in each state in each year may significantly impact TRI reductions.  We used median income for a family of four per state by year as a variable that would account for this economic variability.  We obtained this data from the U.S. Census.  































We used linear regression as the tool to determine the explanatory value of our variables.  The nature of our data dictated that we use a fixed effects model,​[22]​ which we used in combination with a robust regression to correct for heteroskedasticity.  Though we had concerns about the explanatory power of some of our variables, we thought it was important to test all of them in our model rather than reject them immediately.  What appeared to us to be a poor variable may have had explanatory value in combination with the other variables. 
An initial regression of all of our variables against the normalized TRI data produced a model with variables that differed in their explanatory value.  Four variables - press articles, SRI, NGO members and ISO certified companies - had t-stats where 1< t <-1 and p-values 0.300 ≥ p ≥ 0.142.  The seven other variables – LCV rating, lobbying dollars, public opinion, academia, Responsible Care, Westlaw and median income -  had t-stats where 1 > t > -1 and p-values where 0.825 ≥ p ≥ 0.376.  The model had an overall r-squared of 0.018.  (See Appendix 1: Model with all Variables).




Table 1: Correlation Among Variables

           		| pressa~s lcvrating sri lobbying public~t academic ngomem~s respon~s
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------
pressartic~s 	|   1.0000
   lcvrating 	|   0.0072   1.0000
         sri 		|  -0.0004  -0.0164   1.0000
    lobbying 	|  -0.1456   0.0033   0.0250   1.0000
publicopin~t 	|  -0.6510  -0.0002  -0.0987   0.7705   1.0000
    academic 	|  -0.7361  -0.0061  -0.1904   0.6785   0.9662   1.0000
  ngomembers 	|   0.0583   0.2563   0.0326  -0.0415  -0.0703  -0.0775   1.0000
responsibl~s 	|  -0.8964  -0.0031  -0.1847   0.4331   0.8832   0.9318  -0.0754   1.0000
     westlaw 	|  -0.0607  -0.0016  -0.0004  -0.0170   0.0195   0.0328   0.1857   0.0509
medianinco~s 	|   0.2646   0.5129   0.2243  -0.1909  -0.3370  -0.3666   0.2067  -0.3626
ofisocerti~s 	|   0.6623  -0.0020   0.2966  -0.7299  -0.9469  -0.9601   0.0766  -0.8997

             		|  westlaw median~s ofisoc~s
-------------+---------------------------
     westlaw 	|   1.0000
medianinco~s 	|   0.0070   1.0000
ofisocerti~s 	|  -0.0182   0.3814   1.0000 


Running the robust model without the Responsible Care variable yielded a higher r-squared (0.0202).  However, many variables still had t-stats that were too low and p-values that were too high to indicate a sufficient confidence level in the validity of the variables.  Our next step was to run the model again, eliminating the variables with the highest p-values.  These were median income and LCV rating.  Median income’s high p-value confirmed our suspicion that this variable may have little explanatory value (see Discussion of Variables).  Re-running the model without these variables lowered the r-squared to 0.0112, but also raised most of the t-stats and lowered most of the p-values (see Appendix 2: Eight Variable Model).  
We then removed the variables with the highest p-values – westlaw and academic - from the model.  This almost cut the r-squared in half, bringing it down to 0.0103.  However, it brought all but one t-stat to a level such that 1 < t < -1 and brought all but one of the p-values to a level where 0.293 > p.  We eliminated the one variable whose t-stat and p-value did not meet the above criteria, which was public opinion on the environment.  This produced a model with an r squared of 0.0105 where all the t-stats were significant and all the p-values were approaching significance (see Appendix 3: Model with t stats 1 < t < -1).  We then experimented with replacing press articles with a new variable, presslag, which was the press articles variable with a built in time lag of one year.  We hoped this new variable would capture what we surmised was the lag time between an article’s publication and its impact.  Our theory was correct; presslag had a t-stat of -1.09 and a p-value of 0.274, which meant it had greater explanatory value than the press articles variable.    
However, presslag still had the highest p-value of the remaining variables, one that, at 0.274, was too high to give us confidence in the variable’s explanatory power.  Removing presslag from the model decreased the r-squared from 0.0121 to 0.0110, but it also decreased the p-values of the remaining variables – NGO members, SRI investing and ISO certified companies – to p ≤ 0.131.  SRI was the variable whose p-value was highest, at 0.131.  Removing it from the model gave us our final model: 

NormalizedTRIdata = 213,051.5 – 1,125.7*ISOcertifiedcompanies + 4.05* NGOMembers


The model has an r-squared of 0.0114, t-stats of 2.32 and -3.67 and p-values of 0.021 and 0.000 (see Appendix 4: Final Model).

Interpretation of the Model

Our model indicates that a higher number of ISO 14001 certified chemical companies contributes to lower TRI emissions, while a higher number of NGO members contributes to increased TRI emissions.  Though the dramatic difference in coefficients seems to indicate that ISO certification has a much greater influence on lowering emissions than NGO membership does on raising them, one must take into consideration the difference in units in which each dataset is reported.  The number of companies that are ISO 14001 certified ranges from 1 to 92, while the number of NGO members ranges from 172 to 198,590.  Thus the NGO members’ influence is at least ten times stronger than it appears from the coefficients.  
On the surface, the relationship between higher NGO membership and higher TRI emissions seems surprising.  A possible explanation for the correlation could be that NGOs attract more members when companies are polluting more (e.g. TRI emissions are high) because individuals are concerned.  Conversely, they may lose membership when emissions are low and the public thinks there is less cause for alarm.  The relationship therefore may be one of correlation, not causation. 





Implications of the Model for Actors
  
Those inside and outside of chemical manufacturing companies can use the findings of the model to determine the channels to which they should look to predict imminent action on reducing TRI emissions, or those channels through which they should work if they want to hasten the reduction of TRI emissions.
Implications for Activists
Individuals or groups interested in convincing chemical manufacturing companies to reduce their TRI emissions can use the findings of our model to target their efforts.  By working through the action channels that most strongly influence TRI emissions, activists can ensure that they use their limited resources to maximum effect.  Activists interested in convincing chemical manufacturing companies to mitigate their environmental impacts should therefore focus the majority of their efforts on working with corporations that source from the chemical manufacturing industry.  If they can convince these companies to care about environmental performance, it seems likely that this concern will travel down the value chain to the manufacturing companies, causing lasting change.  
Activists should also keep an eye on NGO membership, for a decrease in membership could signify a drop in public concern about chemical manufacturing company emissions. 


Implications for Corporate Executives
The findings of our model suggest that pressure from buyers is the biggest driver of corporate environmental performance.  Hence, when making decisions about whether or not to decrease their companies’ environmental impact, the first thing chemical manufacturing executives should examine is the environmental performance of the buyers of their products.  A company that commits to ISO 14001 certification provides an outward sign that it cares about environmental performance.  It makes sense that this concern would apply to the performance of a company’s suppliers, as well as to its own performance.  Conversely, an executive at a company for which the chemical manufacturing industry is a supplier should realize that pressure from his or her company can lead to lower TRI emissions.
Corporate executives should also look at NGO membership in the states in which they operate facilities, as its decrease may indicate a decrease in concern about their environmental performance by citizens.  

Implications for Environmental NGOs
Our findings may be alarming for environmental NGOs.  We do not think that NGOs should look at our research as an indication that they should stop recruiting members.  However, our model does seem to indicate that focusing on increasing membership is not the best use of NGO resources.  Like activists, these organizations should focus their attention on working with companies that are buyers of chemical manufacturing company products as a lever to change environmental performance farther back in the value chain. 




Limitations of the Model

Care should be taken when interpreting the model.  While our findings are significant, an r-squared of 0.0114 indicates much of the variation in chemical manufacturers’ TRI emissions year to year is not explained by our model.  There are a number of potential explanations as to why our model was unable to explain more of the variation.
Data limitations
As mentioned in the methodology section, many of the variables we used reflected the data that were available, rather than the optimal data.  Using data that were more closely aligned with the pressure we were trying to measure may have increased the validity of our model (see Suggested Improvements to Our Model for Future Researchers for an in-depth discussion of variable limitation). 
Further, the majority of the eleven variables we used varied year to year on a national level instead of a state level.  Only four of our variables – LCV Rating, NGO Membership, Westlaw and Median Income - varied state to state.  One of these remained in our final model.  The lack of interstate variation in most of our variables may mean that the variables that did change on a state level gained more explanatory value than they should have.  Conversely, lack of variation within some of the variables may have robbed these variables of their true significance. 
Finally, our y-variable (TRI emissions) did not vary as much as may be ideal for a y-variable.  This could contribute to the low explanatory value of our model.
Limitations of using a statistical model




Suggested Improvements to Our Model for Future Researchers

We hope that future researchers will use our model as a starting point for continued inquiry into the question of what triggers corporations to decrease their environmental impact.  We outline suggested improvements to some of the variables below, followed by more general suggestions for future research.
Variable Improvements
	Environmental NGOs: In addition to trying to obtain membership data for more of the seventeen NGOs we contacted, those continuing this work may want to create a variable comprising the amount of money raised by environmental NGOs per state as a supplemental indicator to the membership numbers. Membership data alone may provide a distorted picture of an NGO’s influence.  Some NGOs with large memberships may have little money, and vice versa.  Thus fundraising data could provide a further, and perhaps more accurate, window onto the influence of an NGO.  Future researchers may also want to normalize NGO membership as a percentage of state population, which would give a better indication of the relative size of the state constituency that cares about the environment.
	Press: Future teams building on this research may want to survey mainstream papers in addition to the articles in the Lexis-Nexis Environmental Database.  As mentioned in the Methodology section, our assumption was that these journals represented the leading edge of reporting in this industry and that their stories would be picked up by the wider media.  Further research is necessary to verify the validity of this assumption.  Data from major national newspapers such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune might answer this question and provide a more accurate indicator of the influence of the popular press.  Additionally, further teams may want to obtain state-by-state data on the press.  These data could be obtained by using the search terms we used in the major newspaper in each of the fifty states. 
	The Community: The Gallup Poll data records opinions instead of actions.  Research has demonstrated that individuals’ actions often do not correlate with their stated beliefs.  Future researchers should attempt to obtain a variable that better measures community action rather than just opinion.
	Domestic Regulation: LCV ratings measure an elected official’s voting record on the environment.  These scores are therefore not necessarily indicative of an official’s specific views on the environmental performance of the chemical manufacturing industry.  A variable that might be a good additional measure of the power of domestic regulation would be the number of environmental regulations issued in a given state in a given year against the chemical manufacturing industry.
	Socially Responsible Investing: Future researchers should attempt to quantify the amount of SRI investing in the chemical manufacturing industry specifically.  While we could not find an existing dataset with this information, we think it may be an interesting exercise to begin tracking these data for future models.  Another useful dataset to obtain would be the number of shareholder resolutions filed against the chemical manufacturing industry pertaining to the environment in each of the years in our model.  This would directly measure investor pressure on chemical manufacturing companies about environmental issues. 
	Trade Associations:  Membership in Responsible Care is not limited to chemical manufacturing companies (SIC Code 28); petroleum, pharmaceutical and other chemical companies can also join.​[24]​   Thus dividing the total number of companies in Responsible Care by the total number of chemical manufacturing companies for which we collected TRI data did not give an accurate picture of the percentage of chemical manufacturers that belong to Responsible Care.  Nor would measuring the percentage of chemical companies that are members of Responsible Care, because this percentage would reflect companies in industries outside the scope of our model.  Future researchers should measure the percentage of chemical manufacturing companies that were Responsible Care members in each of the years of our model.  This could be done by obtaining the names of all the companies that were members of Responsible Care for each of the years in the model and sorting them by SIC Code, then comparing that the total number of companies with that SIC Code.  The percentage would give a more accurate reflection of how involved the chemical manufacturing industry is in Responsible Care. 
	TRI Emissions: We used TRI emissions as our y-variable because it was a reliable dataset that was gathered consistently over the time frame we examined, and because it measures chemical manufacturing companies’ environmental emissions.  The number we obtained for each state was the aggregate amount of close to 1,000 different chemicals.​[25]​  We did not control for toxicity.  Future researchers may want to control for toxicity, as a small reduction in a highly toxic chemical may be more significant than a large reduction in a less toxic chemical.
Model Methodology Improvements
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Appendix 1: Model with all Variables
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       400
Group variable (i): stateid                     Number of groups   =        50

R-sq:  within  = 0.0517                         Obs per group: min =         8
       between = 0.0455                                        avg =       8.0
       overall = 0.0187                                        max =         8

                                                	   F(11,339)          =      2.18
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2966                        Prob > F           =    0.0149

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             	|                  Robust
normalized~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.           t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
pressartic~s |   213.3085   145.1077     1.47   0.142    -72.11645    498.7335
   lcvrating  |   	259.5164   379.9904     0.68   0.495    -487.9196    1006.952
         sri |   	6393.416   5895.986     1.08   0.279     -5203.91    17990.74
    lobbying |  	-9086.666      16011    -0.57   0.571    -40580.09    22406.76
publicopin~t |  -3971.018   4566.802    -0.87   0.385    -12953.86     5011.82
    academic |   	822.3369   1316.994     0.62   0.533    -1768.172    3412.846
  ngomembers |    2.01561   1.586348     1.27   0.205    -1.104715    5.135936
responsibl~s |   1404.143   4146.007     0.34   0.735    -6750.996    9559.282
     westlaw |  	-6183.522   6975.614    -0.89   0.376    -19904.46    7537.415
medianinco~s |  -1.106513   5.013054    -0.22   0.825    -10.96712    8.754097
ofisocerti~s |  	-1599.754   1539.587    -1.04   0.300    -4628.101    1428.594
       _cons |   	272303.2     897682     0.30   0.762     -1493425     2038031
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    
     sigma_u   347322.42
     sigma_e |  124694.89






Appendix 2: Eight Variable Model


Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       400
Group variable (i): stateid                     Number of groups   =        50

R-sq:  within  = 0.0509                         Obs per group: min =         8
       between = 0.0319                                        avg =       8.0
       overall = 0.0112                                        max =         8

                                                	   F(8,342)           =      2.45
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2604                        Prob > F           =    0.0138

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             	|                     Robust
normalized~a |      Coef.       Std. Err.          t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
pressartic~s 	|   188.7636   111.5377     1.69   0.091    -30.62256    408.1498
         sri 	|   6777.162   5710.666     1.19   0.236    -4455.287    18009.61
    lobbying 	|  -15344.68   13290.77    -1.15   0.249    -41486.61    10797.26
publicopin~t 	|  -2683.439   3034.526    -0.88   0.377    -8652.124    3285.246
    academic 	|   927.0522   1076.896     0.86   0.390     -1191.12    3045.225
  ngomembers 	|   1.942028   1.309168     1.48   0.139    -.6330074    4.517063
     westlaw 	|  -5926.027   6662.665    -0.89   0.374    -19030.99    7178.932
ofisocerti~s 	|  -2170.648   1558.801    -1.39   0.165    -5236.693    895.3966
       _cons 	|   586475.9   328492.2     1.79   0.075     -59643.4     1232595
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u 	|  345003.06
     sigma_e 	|  124199.75






Appendix 3: Model with t stats 1 < t < -1

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       400
Group variable (i): stateid                     Number of groups   =        50

R-sq:  within  = 0.0490                         Obs per group: min =         8
       between = 0.0305                                        avg =       8.0
       overall = 0.0105                                        max =         8

                                                	   F(5,345)           =      3.21
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2538                        Prob > F           =    0.0076

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             	|                  Robust
normalized~a 	|      Coef.   Std. Err.              t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
pressartic~s 	|   175.2665   119.7608     1.46   0.144    -60.28673    410.8197
         sri 	|   5339.994   5233.784     1.02   0.308    -4954.147    15634.14
    lobbying 	|  -16081.18   13742.26    -1.17   0.243    -43110.33    10947.97
  ngomembers 	|   1.863761   1.317967     1.41   0.158    -.7285011    4.456023
ofisocerti~s 	|  -2118.885   1280.629    -1.65   0.099    -4637.707    399.9375
       _cons 	|   510769.7   283446.5     1.80   0.072    -46731.07     1068270
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u 	|  344463.45
     sigma_e 	|  123778.54






Appendix 4: Final Model

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       500
Group variable (i): stateid                     Number of groups   =        50

R-sq:  within  = 0.0373                         Obs per group: min =        10
       between = 0.0263                                        avg =      10.0
       overall = 0.0114                                        max =        10

                                                	   F(2,448)           =      8.47
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3479                        Prob > F           =    0.0002

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             	                  Robust
normalized~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.               t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  ngomembers  |   4.053103   1.748284     2.32   0.021     .6172474    7.488959
ofisocerti~s 	|  -1125.731   306.8528    -3.67   0.000    -1728.781   -522.6819
       _cons 	|   213051.5   12319.82    17.29   0.000     188839.6    237263.3
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u 	|  420766.55
     sigma_e 	|  191398.43




Appendix 5: Sources of Data for Variables


Number of Academic Degrees Awarded by Year:





















Years 1995 through 2002 from Michael L. Barnett, PhD, Professor, College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.  Years 2003 through 2006 from Debra Phillips, Managing Director, Responsible Care

League of Conservation Voter Scores:










From Jstor, available through Kresge Library Database
 
Socially Responsible Investing: 
























































Chemical Industry Cases by State:  1995-2004







































SRI Investment:  1995-2004

























Responsible Care Membership:  1995-2004































Year Graphs by State

Westlaw Chemical Industry Cases by State:  1995-2004

Median Income for 4-Person Family:  1995-2004
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